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This Joint Applied Project examined the technical, operational and programmatic 
implementation of Information Assurance (IA) as it relates to the Commercial-Off-the-
Shelf (COTS) Land Mobile Radio (LMR) program within the United States (U.S.) Army.  
This project provides an overview of the LMR system, its capabilities and technical 
requirements, as well as the IA processes and requirements.  The project then examines 
the technical aspects and impacts of implementing the IA requirements on the LMR 
system with possible interoperability with the Global Information Grid (GIG).  As a 
result of this project, the U.S. Army will have a better understanding of the impact of IA 
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This Joint Applied Project examined the technical, operational and programmatic 
implementation of Information Assurance (IA) as it relates to the Commercial-Off-the-
Shelf (COTS) Land Mobile Radio (LMR) program within the United States (U.S.) Army.  
This project provides an overview of the LMR system and its capabilities and technical 
requirements as well as the IA processes and requirements.  The project then examines 
the technical aspects and impacts of implementing the IA requirements on the LMR 
system, as well as, the drawbacks of integrating LMR onto the Global Information Grid 
(GIG).   
Several Courses of Action (COA) were developed and analyzed to determine 
possible options that the Project Manager for the LMR program could pursue.  These 
COAs weighed the benefits and consequences of taking no action in implementing IA 
into the LMR system, integrating the full IA requirements throughout all the architectures 
and implementing an IA plan for the Platform IT enclave.  Following the analysis of the 
COAs, it was determined that classifying LMR as a Platform IT system would provide 
the desired security without having significant negative impacts on the funding, operation 
and performance of the system.   
As a result of this project, the U.S. Army will have a better understanding of the 



























The Land Mobile Radio (LMR) system is the primary means of communication 
within the first responder community and is critical to the safety and well being of those 
depending on the reliable operation of the system.  LMR systems are fielded as 
independent United States (U.S.) Army Enterprise sub-systems and leverage unused 
portions of existing fiber infrastructure at U.S. Army locations to connect LMR system 
components together in an intranet-style network.  In an attempt to increase the capability 
of the LMR systems, the U.S. Army now plans to incorporate LMR data streams onto the 
Global Information Grid (GIG).  Since the LMR system would now pass voice and data 
in bit streams, the Department of Defense (DoD) categorized the LMR as an Information 
Technology (IT) system.  According to DoD directives, all IT systems must be compliant 
and accredited in accordance with the DoD Information Assurance Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DIACAP).   
LMR systems are Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) products and are procured 
and installed in accordance with the prevailing industry standards.  In addition to the 
transmission components of the LMR system, IT networking components, such as servers 
and routers, have been integrated into the system in order to assist with transporting voice 
and data through the system.  The categorization of the system as an IT system and now 
the integration of these IT products have forced not only Information Assurance (IA) 
requirements and processes to be applied to the LMR systems, but has also caused LMR 
vendors to have to provide “unique solutions” to acceptably meet the DIACAP 
requirements.  Because most of the LMR system components are considered COTS, 
having to design, develop and implement engineering changes to an already developed 
and mature product for the new U.S. government specific or unique IA requirements, 
challenges the idea that these systems are still considered COTS.  Since LMR vendors 
use commercially available products, they are also at the mercy of third party vendors to 
find adequate resolutions.  Current systems offered by vendors are being altered to 





government-unique IA requirement requires COTS modifications and puts a significant 
cost and technical burden on both the Project Manager (PM) and the user for the future to 
satisfy the newly levied requirements.   
To best determine how significant these impacts are, the primary question that 
must be answered is, “What is the impact to the LMR system by placing the IA 
requirements on the COTS components?”  Through the following chapters, several 
supporting questions must also be answered, such as “What are the operational 
requirements and characteristics of a LMR system?”, “What is the purpose of 
implementing IA into LMR systems?”, “What are the IA boundaries once the DIACAP is 
implemented on a LMR system?” and finally, “What are the operational implications of 
IA on LMR?”, “How does the implementation of IA affect the LMR COTS acquisition 
concept?” and “Should the DIACAP process be implemented based on these impacts?” 
The following chapters, in an attempt to answer the above questions, will provide 
an overview of the radio, describe the LMR system capability and components as well as 
provide information on the directives and DIACAP processes and discuss the IA 
requirements that apply to LMR.  Once completed, this paper will assist the DoD and 
industry in understanding the possible impacts of IA requirements being placed on COTS 





II. LAND MOBILE RADIO SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
A. HISTORY OF THE RADIO 
Radio usage and availability began to increase in the early 1900s when the 
transatlantic telegraph cable was laid across the Atlantic Ocean enabling the first signals 
to be sent.1   By the 1930s, one-way broadcasts were available to users such as the police 
department, followed by a two-way Amplitude Modulation (AM) broadcast capability.  
Early radio communications used Morse code with dedicated operators.  Through the 
1940s, Frequency Modulation (FM) capabilities were employed, with the 1950s bringing 
size and weight reductions that allowed for hand held opportunities to be provided to 
users.  By the 1960s, mobile radios were being delivered for use in public safety radio 
systems.2   
As radio technology continued to advance with miniaturization, increased 
human/machine interfaces and power capability, the two-way radio communications 
equipment became much more widely used and is now capable of being installed in 
vehicles.  Radio technology continued to advance and mature with large technical 
working groups focusing on ways to further the abilities of radio communication.3 
Today's radio equipment, such as the LMR, is designed for ease of use and is 
widely used by non-tactical personnel for emergency first responder organizations, public 
works organizations and companies with large fleets of vehicles or numerous field staff.  
Systems with many individual components are linked together using various technologies 
to integrate the components and provide ever-increasing coverage for radio users.  Just as 
technology has driven the computer industry to smaller, more powerful personal 
computers (PCs), the LMR industry has leveraged that technology to provide many more 
capabilities other than simple voice to the radio user.  Today’s users have the ability to 
scan the Internet, use Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and pass data such as 





The following sections provide background information, as well, as provide an 
overview of the LMR system, allowing for identification of the operational requirement 
and the characteristics of the LMR system.   
B. LAND MOBILE RADIO BACKGROUND 
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Telecommunications section Title 47, 
defines a Land Mobile Radio system to be, “A regularly interacting group of base, mobile 
and associated control and fixed relay stations intended to provide land mobile radio 
communications service over a single area of operation.5” The word mobile is used to 
relate to the motion or movement of a radio system (both hand-held and portable) and not 
necessarily to a vehicle.6   
The U.S. Army’s LMR system was originally procured to provide a wireless 
voice communications capability for installation military police, fire departments and 
medical response units.  It provided a local solution to meet site-specific requirements.  
The U.S. Army LMR systems were non-tactical systems and were not intended to support 
combat missions or be deployed with a combat force.7 
  The nature of the situation has changed and the U.S. Army LMR system is now 
an integral part of the Army info-structure.  The original requirement has evolved into a 
requirement to support an installation force protection and public safety network, with a 
future integrated voice and data transport capability.  Particularly since the events of 
September 11, 2001, the various military installations throughout the country have 
created interdependencies with the surrounding state and local governments.  As a result 
of the interoperability requirements, the installation LMR network must interconnect with 
state and local counterpart mobile radio networks.  Security concerns have broadened that 
interdependency from the traditional public safety role to that of an integrated capability 
to support Homeland Security operations.8 
C. LAND MOBILE RADIO SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY 
Each system’s architecture, although individually designed, does have common 




Requirements Statement (CRS), which identifies a specific user’s needs and 
requirements.  Each customer’s site requirements are different, which means there is not 
a single architectural solution for all users.  An architecture will differ according to the 
specific components and technologies used.9 
1. LMR Components 
Figure 1 shows the basic components of a LMR system.10 Each component 
provides the following function for the overall system: 
• Antennas and Repeaters receive and transmit Radio Frequency (RF) signals 
among radios and with the infrastructure 
• Infrastructure provides the backbone of the system and enables connectivity 
between antennas and control lines 
• Control lines connect LMR management facilities to remote sites 
• Remote sites serve as a fixed interface to the LMR system, containing 
consoles, which allow monitoring of multiple end user devices from a central 
location.  They also provide a connection into the system for configuration 
and management. 
• Radios are the end user devices, which transmit and receive the signals from 
the antennas.  Radios can include various form factors such as hand-held, 






Figure 1.   Land Mobile Radio System Components (From: Land Mobile Radio: The 
Basics, 2008) 
The LMR is an integrated system comprised of the components in Figure 1, which 
work together to provide a near seamless standard of communication.  These components 
can be further grouped by their architectural functions:  the subscriber units, the dispatch 
products and the system infrastructure.   
 The subscriber unit components consist of the hand-held, mobile and desktop 
two-way RF communication devices.   
 The dispatch product components consist of the radio dispatch consoles or 
dispatch control center and a voice and a data recorder.  The system infrastructure 
consists of several configuration items:   
• Comparators: process data collected from multiple receivers to create the best 
possible transmission signal in multi-cast and simulcast systems 
• Subscribers: end-user devices which provide digital communications 
• Controllers:  provide network access, site database information and an Internet 




• System / Network Management Equipment:  contain the following: 
o Network Manager: used to view, monitor, and manage the 
performance of the LMR network 
o Gateway: provides integration capabilities between different LMR 
systems  
o Switching center: manages the routing and switching of voice 
messages.   
2. LMR Technologies 
The technologies utilized in the LMR system address selectable frequency 
transmission, modulation techniques and channel access to signals.  The LMR system is 
capable of operating in several frequency bands, which are designated for mobile 
communications by the U.S. National Table of Frequency Allocations.  These frequencies 
usually are in the Very High Frequency (VHF), Ultra High Frequency (UHF) and UHF 
High Band.11 
Modulation is the process of encoding information on the transmission side onto a 
carrier in a manner suitable for transmission with demodulation occurring on the 
receiving end, which extracts the information from the carrier for processing.  The 
modulation schemes used in the LMR systems are either analog or digital.  Analog 
modulation converts audio voice signals into RF signals in the form of continuous waves.  
This type of modulation was present in the first generation of the LMR systems.  The 
second modulation technique is digital modulation, which converts the signals into a 
digital bit stream of ones and zeros.  Following a mandate from DoD, LMR systems are 
to utilize the digital type of modulation in order to achieve the performance advantages of 
enhanced voice quality, improved spectrum efficiency and reduced background noise and 
interference.12  
LMR systems access radio frequencies by using either the conventional or 
trunking technology, or a combination of both (hybrid).  These technologies are detailed 
in the following paragraphs.  The user’s unique site requirements dictate which 




Conventional LMR systems work on a simplex mode of operation where only one 
frequency is used for both transmit and receive.  Using fixed RF channels, radios operate 
on one channel at a time.  The proper channel is selected by a user via a channel selector 
or buttons on the radio control panel to pick the desired channel. 
A graphical depiction of this type of approach is shown in Figure 2, as it 
demonstrates that users are required to stay in one frequency or channel.13  This 
conventional approach to communications means that the communication channel is only 
one-way, so radio users can either transmit or receive, but not simultaneously.  
Additionally, users are assigned to specific frequencies, which are preprogrammed onto 
repeaters.  This approach can be an inefficient use of spectrum when many radio users 
need to share the same system.  Some repeaters would be at capacity while others would 
barely have any communication traffic.  Conventional technology is simple, has lower 
costs and is supported by a large number of vendors.  The frequencies are dedicated to 
specific channels, with users having to manually select a voice channel.  A negative 
characteristic to the conventional approach is that when a channel is in use, other users 
who may want to transmit a signal on that channel must listen and wait for the current 
users to complete their conversation. 
 
 




Unlike conventional systems, trunked LMR systems use a full duplex operational 
mode.  Full duplex utilizes two frequencies: one for repeater transmit (radio receive) and 
one for repeater receive (radio transmit).  At any given time, the communications channel 
is two-way and radio users do not have specific frequency assignments.  In a trunked 
radio system, the system manager automatically selects the physical radio frequency 
channel.  Protocols, which have been developed, help establish the interoperability and 
compatibility between the radio and the radio backbone or network.  These protocols also 
establish the channel assignments to be selected automatically.  One (or more) of the 
channels is assigned as a dedicated control channel, while the remaining channels are 
assigned as voice channels.  Some of the advantages to using the trunked technology are 
that it has an increased traffic capacity for a given number of RF channels and during a 
voice call, the LMR system automatically selects an available voice channel and assigns 








Figure 3.   Trunked Approach (From: Land Mobile Radio: The Basics, 2008) 
A third configuration is the hybrid system.  This system is comprised of a 
combination of conventional and trunked systems.  A hybrid system offers both 
conventional and trunked features to users within a single system.  The advantages and 




focusing on cost, it may not be cost-effective to have a purely trunked site in an area with 
just a few users or purely a conventional site where some areas have a higher user 
density.  As stated earlier, every user’s requirements and site architectures are different.  
The second reason is call setup delay.  Because it is sometimes important to provide 
immediate communication in situations, such as for first responders, conventional 
channels can be implemented to provide dedicated access with minimal call setup delay.  
The issue comes when other users come on site and are willing to accept the delay and 
prefer trunked channels to take advantage of the capacity increase.  Because no scenario 
is the same, sometimes a hybrid system architecture is needed to provide conventional 
and trunked overlays in a single system.15 
The previous sections described the components and capabilities of the LMR 
system.  The following sections describe the policies and standards the LMR system must 
follow. 
D. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION (NTIA) AND THE NARROWBAND MANDATE 
The LMR system falls under the guidance and regulations of the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, which is responsible for administering spectrum assigned for 
federal agency use.  The NTIA establishes policies concerning frequency assignment, 
allocation and use, and also provides the various federal departments and agencies with 
guidance to ensure that their conduct of telecommunications activities is consistent with 
these policies.  As part of the Executive Branch, the NTIA serves as the President’s 
principle adviser and provides guidance on telecommunications policies involving the 
economy and technologies as well as helps with the regulation of the telecommunications 
industry.  In addition to these duties, the NTIA presents the position of the Executive 
Branch to Congress and other agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC).16 
In November 1992, the FCC released Docket 92-235 to revise the private Land 




of the narrowbanding effort, a response to the public safety personnel’s request for 
additional spectrum in the bands below 512 MHz.17 The decision was made to split the 
channels from 25 kHz to 12.5 kHz creating additional use of the spectrum.  The FCC set 
forth specific deadlines for systems to meet the narrowbanding mandate. The deadline for 
federal government users required conversion to narrowband by January 2005 for VHF 
and January 2008 for UHF.18 
E. APCO P25 OVERVIEW 
An additional group, consisting of several organizations and agencies, joined 
together to develop a set of standards for radio communications.  This effort, named 
Project 25 (P25), was developed by the Association of Public Safety Communications 
Officials International (APCO), the National Association of State Telecommunications 
Directors (NASTD), the National Communications System (NCS) and various Federal 
Agencies.  These policies were standardized by the Telecommunications Industry 
Association (TIA).  The standards were written for digital radio communications 
primarily used by federal, state and local public safety agencies in North America to 
enable them to communicate with other agencies and mutual aid response teams in 
emergencies.  The purpose of establishing P25 was to focus on the need for a 
communications standard for a common digital public safety radio, which would serve to 
benefit emergency response and Homeland Security personnel.19 
P25's ‘Suite of Standards’ specify eight open interfaces between the various 
components of a land mobile radio system.  These interfaces are:  
• Common Air Interface (CAI) standard specifies the type and content of 
signals transmitted by compliant radios. A single radio utilizing the CAI 
should be able to communicate with any other CAI radio, regardless of 
manufacturer 
• Subscriber Data Peripheral Interface standard specifies the port through 




• Fixed Station Interface standard specifies a set of mandatory messages 
supporting digital voice, data, encryption and telephone interconnect 
necessary for communication between a fixed station and P25 RF subsystem  
• Console Subsystem Interface standard specifies the basic messaging to 
interface a console subsystem to a P25 RF subsystem  
• Network Management Interface standard specifies a single network 
management scheme, which will allow all network elements of the RF 
subsystem to be managed  
• Data Network Interface standard specifies the RF subsystem's connections 
to computers, data networks or external data sources  
• Telephone Interconnect Interface standard specifies the interface to Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) supporting both analog and Integrated 
Services Digital Network (ISDN) telephone interfaces 
• Inter-RF Sub-System Interface (ISSI) standard specifies the interface 
between RF subsystems which will allow them to be connected into wide 
area networks  
P25-compliant technology, which incorporates these interfaces, is being deployed 
in several phases.  Phase 1 radio systems operate in 12.5 kHz analog, digital or mixed 
mode and their radios use Constant Envelope 4-Level Frequency Modulation (C4FM) 
modulation for digital transmissions at 4800 baud and 2 bits per symbol, yielding 9600 
bits per second total channel throughput.  Radios, which utilize the C4FM standard are 
also capable of demodulating the Compatible Differential Offset Quadrature Phase Shift 
Keying (CQPSK) standard since the parameters of the CQPSK signal use the same signal 
deviation at symbol time as the C4FM and only use 6.25 kHz of bandwidth.   
Companies, which have concluded development on the Phase I systems, have 
ensured that all the requirements in the specifications were followed.  These requirements 
include capabilities such as backwards compatibility and interoperability with other 
compliant systems.  Additionally, the P25 standards require an open standards interface 




  In order to improve spectrum utilization, Phase 2 is currently under development 
with concurrent work being done on 2-slot Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and 
Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) modulation schemes.  The TDMA and 
FDMA modulation schemes make up the CQPSK modulation schemes.  Phase 2 will use 
the Advanced Multi-Band Excitation (AMBE) vocoder to reduce the needed bit rate so 
that one channel will only require 4800 bits per second. 
In addition, as part of the Phase 2 work, focus is being placed on interoperability 
with legacy or older equipment as well as the interfaces between the system components, 
such as repeaters.  Focus is also being given to roaming capacity and spectral efficiency 
or channel reuse.  Phase 2 also looks to help with the human to machine interface to assist 
operators with training and better operations. 
 Although interoperability is a key focus of P25, there are still many challenges, 
especially with interoperability.  The P25 systems should theoretically all work together, 
but since made by different companies, challenges exist with frequencies, training, 
standard operating procedures and functions.  To try to address these challenges and help 
achieve interoperability, some have scaled back the features and created a “vanilla” P25 
implementation.  Although this meets the P25 requirements, the intended benefits of P25 
are not totally fulfilled.20 
This chapter has provided an overview of the LMR system, its requirements and 
characteristics as well as governing bodies who regulate and control the capabilities and 
performance.  The next chapter reviews new directives and organizational users which 




































III. DIRECTIVE FOR LAND MOBILE RADIO 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
 In August 2001, DoD issued a policy involving the acquisition of LMR systems.  
This policy defined Land Mobile Radio and required that all LMR products comply with 
the security measures set forth in the National Security Telecommunications and 
Information Systems Security Policy (NSTISSP) No. 11 and the DoD Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) guidance and policy memorandum No. 6-8510 dated 16 June 2000.  These 
two policy requirements set the stage for LMR to, not only be considered an IT product, 
but to require the need for LMR to be “hardened” in accordance with the DoD GIG IA 
policies.21  
This policy, released by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, covered all military 
LMR assets worldwide, both fixed and mobile.  The basic thrust of the policy was to 
ensure that DoD complied with the upcoming NTIA narrowband mandate in a timely, 
cost-effective manner.  This policy provided definitions for the types of LMR, as well as 
set the stage for the appropriate levels of encryption and security required. 
The policy defined three Information Assurance levels as “levels of robustness” 
needed to secure LMR based upon its functions.  Level one defined a basic level of 
encryption based on good business practices.  Level two, a medium robustness, was 
determined based on the mission category and/or information sensitivity.  At the highest 
level, level three, was reserved for classified information and mission critical systems. 
The policy further defined two types of LMR: tactical and non-tactical.  A LMR 
intended for use in combat, tactical applications or for mission critical applications was 
deemed tactical LMR and required the highest level of robustness.  All other LMRs used 
for administrative and mission support functions were to be considered non-tactical LMR 
and would require basic or medium levels of robustness depending on their mission 
definition. 
The DoD policy further directed that all new LMR systems comply with the 




state, local and Federal public safety providers could begin to offer mutual aid to one 
another.  Infrastructure and radios that met the Project 25 standards eventually had to 
communicate in analog mode with legacy analog radios, and systems, and in either digital 
or analog mode with other Project 25 compliant radios and systems.23  
B. OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it became obvious that LMR, 
although a vital component to communications during disasters, was woefully 
inadequate.  It became painfully clear that LMR needed to be considered in greater depth 
and with more planning than initially expected by DoD.  Days after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, it was announced by President George W. Bush that the Office of 
Homeland Security would be created and would have the responsibility to coordinate 
with other departments and oversee a National Strategy to protect the country. 
Later in 2002, the National Strategy for protecting the country was released and 
identified three objectives:  
1. “Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;  
2. Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and  
3. Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”24 
This National Strategy provided direction and guidance for federal departments 
and agencies on steps to take to improve security.  The National Strategy also provided 
guidance for others such as state and local governments, corporations and businesses and 
individual citizens.  
On November 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, which created the United States Department of Homeland Security, 
resulting in the largest federal government reorganization since the Department of 
Defense was created via the National Security Act of 1947.25 
With the creation of this organization, a new group of users would need the LMR 






C. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
In late February 2002, the Department of the Army (DA) issued a memorandum 
that included an Army Supplement to DoD Land Mobile Radio policy, a Plan for Army 
LMR Narrowbanding and the Concept for Support to National Homeland Security.  LMR 
was now made an integral part of the Army Infrastructure to support installation Force 
Protection and Public Safety networks with future integrated voice and data transport 
capability.  The DA made it clear that LMR would be installed to help meet the National 
Homeland Security mission.26 
The Concept for Support to National Homeland Security had several objectives.  
The primary objective was to replace existing LMR infrastructure to comply with the 
NTIA narrowband mandate while employing commercial standards to maximize 
interoperability, competition and flexibility.  The second objective was to provide the 
ability for U.S. Army installations to interconnect and communicate with surrounding 
Federal, State and local Force Protection and Public Safety in an effort to provide 
incident consequence management.  The Concept for Support document also supported 
the U.S. Army’s commitment to contribute to the National mission and assist in the 
development of capabilities wherever possible. 
These acts of policy shaped the current Army Land Mobile Radio program into an 
IT based system, which requires security commensurate with the information currently 
being passed through it.  After the September 11 attacks, much of the information 
previously considered sensitive at best, was now considered National Security. 
This chapter has provided an overview of the directives and rationale for directing 
that IA be implemented on the LMR system.  The following chapters will provide an 
overview of the processes and procedures required by DoD for implementing IA into 
























IV. DOD INFORMATION ASSURANCE IMPLEMENTATION 
According to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG), the IT infrastructure for 
the DoD is called the GIG, a globally connected set of information capabilities.  If an IT 
system is standalone, it is considered Non-GIG IT.  The DoD has required that IT system 
information be protected to ensure availability, integrity, authentication and 
confidentiality.27   The directions and instructions to complete this are found in the DoD 
8500 series of publications and are required by the PMs to be reviewed for applicability 
and compliance.28 
A. DIACAP  
In order for DoD Information Systems (IS) to be approved and authorized to 
operate in their designed environment, they must first undergo a Certification and 
Accreditation (C&A) process.  The C&A process is a set of procedures and assessments 
meant to verify the suitability of a system to operate.29   According to the Committee on 
National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction Number 4009, certification is defined as, 
“Comprehensive evaluation of the technical and nontechnical security safeguards of an IS 
to support the accreditation process that establishes the extent to which a particular 
design and implementation meets a set of specified security requirements.”  Accreditation 
is defined as, “Formal declaration by a Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA) that an 
IS is approved to operate at an acceptable level of risk, based on the implementation of an 
approved set of technical, managerial, and procedural safeguards.”30  
The DoD established this C&A process, known as the DIACAP, found in DoD 
Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01, to provide guidance and help manage the implementation of 
Information Assurance capabilities and services or controls.  DoD established a policy for 
all ISs that forms a standard, enterprise process for certifying and accrediting ISs and 
assists with system compliance with GIG standards as well as the network centric 
environment.  ISs are to follow this process to also help identify and manage risk on their 
IA capabilities.  This process, which replaced the previous method, the DoD Information 




standard method in which DoD ISs achieve their Authority to Operate (ATO).31 The main 
changes made between the DITSCAP and DIACAP are an increased focus on the IA 
controls to serve as the main security requirements for ISs.32   
The DIACAP focuses on the C&A process from a lifecycle and enterprise point 
of view.  The DIACAP encourages PMs to have their systems participate in the process 
early in their system lifecycles.  This allows for IA personnel and stakeholders to be 
involved in the requirements development process.  This method benefits the systems by 
linking the C&A process into the development process, which helps address 
implementation and system risks.  The DIACAP consists of the phases and activities 





Figure 4.   DIACAP Activities (From DoDI 8510.01, 2007) 
Phase I, Initiate and Plan, focuses on the steps taken by new systems, which 
involve registering the system with the DoD component and forming a team to develop a 
plan and work the process.  Phase II, Implement and Validate, involves carrying out the 




Decisions, involves analyzing the risks and determining the C&A path forward.  Phase 
IV, Maintain ATO, involves implementation of the IA controls and maintaining them 
throughout the life of the system.  Periodic reviews are held not less than annually.  Phase 
V, Decommission, is the final phase as the system is reaching its end of life and the 
processes are closed out.34 
The typical timeframes associated with this implementation of IA into a program 




Figure 5.   Timeframes for IA Activities (From Interim Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, 2009) 
The DIACAP helps ensure ISs receive accreditation and are complaint with the 
GIG standards by assisting the ISs to implement the IA controls according to DoD 
directives and legislative policy, such as the IA Department of Defense Directive 
(DoDD) 8500 series and Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA).  The 




8520.2 documents and are compliant with the Federal Information Processing Standards 
(FIPS), which are a set of standards and guidelines issued by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) for usage in federal computer systems.36   FISMA, 
from Title III of the E-Government Act, requires Federal agencies to develop, document 
and insert a program that will provide IA.37 
The GIG is a network centric system providing a “globally interconnected, end-
to-end set of information capabilities,” in order to support the DoD and other agency 
systems.38  The GIG is envisioned to provide connectivity and information sharing 
capabilities to military communities located at all sites to include bases, posts, stations 
and other facilities and platforms.  This network is dependent on the IA components and 
capabilities in order to provide a defense in depth protection on the information being 
transmitted.  The system’s information being transmitted across the network is prioritized 
and categorized according to the Mission Assurance Category (MAC) and Confidentiality 
Levels (CL).  As required in DoDD 8500.01E, “All DoD information systems shall be 
assigned a mission assurance category that is directly associated with the importance of 
the information they contain relative to the achievement of DoD goals and objectives, 
particularly the warfighters' combat mission.39”    
It is the responsibility of each PM to assign these IA controls, which are assigned 
based on the MAC and CLs.  Both the MAC and CL are defined according to the system 
requirements or by user representatives and are based upon the system information’s 
importance and criticality to the mission.  There are three levels for both the MAC and 
CLs, with each level representing increasing IA requirements for the information.40   
Based on its design and its confidentiality level, LMR is categorized as a MAC III 









Table 1.   Possible Combinations of Mission Assurance Category  and 
Confidentiality Level (After: DoDI 8500.2, 2003) 
Since there is countless information being transmitted across many different 
systems, IA requirements and processes to protect that information must be tailored to fit 
the mission assurance category and confidentiality levels assigned to that information.  
As part of the program’s lifecycle process, it must be determined what type of system 
will be developed and what type of information will be transmitted across it.  By 
investigating and reviewing these areas, PMs must determine which IA requirements are 
applicable.  By leveraging guidelines found in DoDD 8500.01E, determination of system 
type is established and IA requirements applied.   
B. DOD INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
In general, the term Information System (IS) refers to a system of people, data 
records or activities that process the data and information in an organization, and it 
includes the organization's manual and automated processes.  In DoDD 8500.01E, an IS 
is defined as a set of information resources organized for the collection, storage, 
processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, disposition, display or transmission 
of information.  There are several types of IS categorized by: AIS applications, enclaves, 
outsourced IT-based processes and platform IT interconnections.42  Each acquisition 
program containing information technology should fall into one of these categories.  IT, 





equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, 
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission or reception of data or 
information by the DoD Component.43   
Based upon the description above, the LMR system falls into two of the 
categories for IS, an enclave and the Platform IT.  In order to determine the baseline IA 
requirements for the LMR system, one must look at both the definitions of the enclave 
and Platform IT, as well as the way in which the system operates to determine the final 
system type.   
An enclave, as defined in DoDD 8500.01E, is a “collection of computing 
environments connected by one or more internal networks under the control of a single 
authority and security policy, including personnel and physical security.  They provide 
standard IA capabilities such as boundary defense, incident detection and response, and 
key management, and also deliver common applications such as office automation and 
electronic mail.  Enclaves are analogous to general support systems as defined in 
reference (j).  Examples of enclaves include local area networks and the applications they 
host, backbone networks, and data processing centers.”  The enclave category of DoD IS 
for LMR can be considered non-GIG IT, since it is a “stand-alone, self-contained, or 
embedded IT that is not or will not be connected to the enterprise network 44”   Since 
LMR is a stand-alone information system, it is a subset of the enclave as defined.45   
Each LMR system architecture is designed and implemented differently, but it is 
organized or designed based on a specific operating environment and contains an internal 
network controlled by a single or central management center.   Figure 6 shows a notional, 






Figure 6.   Notional LMR Architecture (After: Land Mobile Radio: The Basics, 2008) 
Platform IT, as also defined in DoDD 8500.01E, refers to “computer resources, 
both hardware and software, that are physically part of, dedicated to, or essential in real 
time to the mission performance of special purpose systems such as … transport vehicles, 
buildings…46”   Each Platform IT will have a set of applicable IA requirements when it is 
stand-alone and a different set of IA requirements when connected to other Platform ITs 
or to other networks.  The connection or the Platform IT interconnection is the, “network 
access to platform IT.  Platform IT interconnection has readily identifiable security 
considerations and needs that must be addressed in both acquisition, and operations.46”   
Examples of these Platform IT connections that require IA considerations include 
communications interfaces for information transmission with enclaves for the purpose of 
mission planning or execution, remote administration as well as for remote upgrade or 
reconfiguration tasks.  Figure 7 shows an example architecture, with an enclave 






Figure 7.   Notional Architecture with Interconnection (After: Land Mobile Radio: 
The Basics, 2008) 
To best determine the applicability and the extent of the IA requirement impact to 
the LMR system, one must determine exactly which DoD IS category and 
implementation of LMR architecture should apply and what the boundaries should be.  
Figure 8 shows how acquisition programs can be categorized and helps determine the IA 







Figure 8.   IA Compliance by Acquisition Program Type (From Interim Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook, 2009) 
PMs can attempt to determine which path forward should be followed.  LMR is 
not an Automated IS (AIS) or Major AIS and is not outsourced, so the top portion of the 
figure would not apply.  Based on the information provided above, LMR could be 
considered a Platform IT.  Since the system is relied upon by first responders and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel, it could also be categorized as a 
mission critical / mission essential system.  In looking at the figure, a system IA strategy 
would be needed and the DoDD 8500 series (DIACAP process) would only be required if 
LMR is connected to the GIG.   
C. DOD IA PROCESS APPLICABILITY FOR LAND MOBILE RADIO 
Land Mobile Radio has been defined by DoD as a radio, which operates in a 




Radio Program is considered non-tactical since the radios are used in an administrative 
capacity for garrison security, emergency response, logistics and maintenance.  As a non-
tactical form of communication, DoD has further stated that, “Non-tactical LMRs likely 
to be used for communicating Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information shall meet 
medium or basic robustness…50”   
The DoDD 8500.01E, paragraph 2.3, identifies the applicability and scope of the 
directive and states that it (DoDD 8500.01E) “does not apply to weapons systems as 
defined by DoD Directive 5144.1 or other IT components, both hardware and software, 
that are physically part of, dedicated to or essential in real time to a platform's mission 
performance where there is no platform IT interconnection.”51 
 
 
Figure 9.   Platform IT (From DON CIO Memo 01-09, 2009) 
As illustrated in Figure 9, generally all GIG related IT is subject to IA policy and 
the C&A process, but Platform IT is excluded from the C&A process.52   The Platform IT 
Interconnection is the only aspect of Platform IT specifically subject to the C&A process, 
per DoDD 8500.01E and DoDI 8510.01.  Furthermore, DoDD 8500.01E states that a 
stand-alone system, which is a system that does not have any connections to the network, 
will follow the C&A process, unless it meets the Platform IT categorization.  Just because 
a system is categorized as stand-alone, it is not automatically a Platform IT. 
Although there is not an official Determination Statement by the fielding PM, the 
following apply to Land Mobile Radio as it is currently being fielded.  LMR is a stand-




setting.  Its special-purpose mission is essential in real time.  It does not provide general 
IT services, such as e-mail, common office applications, networking for one or more non-
Platform IT systems, or business functions.   
The IA policy applies generally to all Information Systems.  It is the responsibility 
of the systems’ PM to ensure that the IA controls are inserted into the system, even if 
there is no formal C&A process.  PMs should ensure that the maximum IA controls, 
according to their mission, are inserted into their systems, regardless of whether they are 
designated as Platform IT.  As stated by the DAG, “PMs for acquisitions of Platforms 
with IT that do not interconnect with the GIG retain the responsibility to incorporate all 
IA protective measures necessary to support the platform’s combat or support mission 
functions.”53   
Per Defense Acquisition Policy (the DoD 5000 series, and DoDI 8580.1), IA is 
applicable to all DoD- and Army-owned or controlled information systems that receive, 
process, store, display or transmit DoD information, regardless of MAC or CL.54 
The Army and Defense Acquisition Policies are satisfied by employing the tenets 
of defense-in-depth for layering IA solutions within a given IT asset and among assets.  
Solutions should be of the appropriate robustness, as determined by the relative strength 
of the mechanism, and the confidence that the solutions are implemented and perform as 
intended.  The IA solutions that provide availability, integrity and confidentiality also 
provide authentication and non-repudiation. 
The goal of IA for DoD/Army IT systems, as stated in DoDD 8500.1E, paragraph 
4.2 is, “All DoD information systems shall maintain an appropriate level of 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and availability that reflect a 
balance among the importance and sensitivity of the information and information assets; 
documented threats and vulnerabilities; the trustworthiness of users and interconnecting 
systems; the impact of impairment or destruction to the DoD information system; and 
cost effectiveness.55”  
The IA Controls provided in DoDI 8500.2 apply to the definition, configuration, 





management framework for the allocation, monitoring, and regulation of IA resources 
that is consistent with Federal guidance provided in Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Circular A-130.56 
Based upon the above statements from the various DoD Directives and 
Instructions, the IA requirements for the system are based upon the system status of the 
LMR system.  As stated previously, if operating as a separate system in either a stand-
alone system or as a separate Platform IT, the process is greatly different than if the LMR 
system is to connect to an outside network and utilize an IT Interconnect.  The boundaries 
of the system are architecture dependent.  Should the system be stand-alone, then only a 
tailored DIACAP process would apply.  Should the system connect to an external 
network, then the LMR system must go through the C&A process.  Operationally, after a 
standalone system is fielded, it would be a significant security impact to the system to 
have it connected to an external network.  If this interconnection were to occur, after 
fielding, the design of the system would have to be modified in order to successfully 
complete accreditation.   
In this chapter, the DIACAP processes and the implications of IA systems were 
reviewed.  Now that it has been established what the applicability of the C&A process 
and the IA policy for IT systems is, the next chapter will attempt to address the various 
courses of action that the PM can take to address the IA requirements for the LMR 
system.  The following chapter will examine how the implementation of IA affect the 











V. ANALYSIS OF IA REQUIREMENT APPLICATION OF LMR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Developing a clear understanding of the impact that Information Assurance 
requirements have on existing COTS products is challenging due to the complexity of 
information systems in general and the ever-changing climate that requires directives and 
guidance to constantly transform to keep up with security risks. To that end, this chapter 
analyzes the extent to which the U.S. Army LMR acquisition concept for COTS LMR 
should or should not be modified to reflect altering existing COTS products to satisfy 
current DoD initiatives as well as to what extent the C&A (DIACAP) process should be 
implemented in the LMR system.  In order to assess the best course of action, we must 
first identify what some of the alternatives are. 
B. COURSES OF ACTION (COA) 
The purpose of this section is to analyze possible alternatives or courses of action 
(COAs) available for dealing with IA on COTS LMR products.  This section addresses 
three possible courses of action that a PM could pursue when considering how to 
implement IA on their COTS LMR products system.  These are: 
1. Take No Action 
2. Implement the Full IA Requirements Throughout All Portions of the LMR 
Architecture 
3. Implement an IA Plan for Platform IT  with no interconnect to the network 
As each course of action is reviewed, the impact that alternative has on funding, 
resources, time and overall security will also be discussed. 
1. COA 1—Take No Action 
This COA involves not making any changes to the current LMR system 





(CONOPS).  Deciding not to take any action and do nothing could be an alternative for 
an architecture that consists of COTS products that stand alone and therefore have no 
security impacts on other systems.   
By not altering the LMR architecture or making any design changes to COTS 
LMR products, this approach allows maximum funding to be allocated to providing the 
currently designed LMR systems to the Army, leveraging commercial pricing and 
practices to the greatest extent possible.  All Army LMR resources could remain 
dedicated to the acquisition and integration of these LMR systems into the field and 
providing the latest technology to first responders.  As no changes would be made to the 
system or the acquisition processes, the time needed to acquire the system and install at 
desired locations would not change from how operations are done currently.  
Furthermore, any innovations or updates to the current LMR capabilities created by the 
vendors could be instituted quickly into new systems without the need for extensive 
validation and verification.  Since in this instance, the LMR system would be a 
standalone system and not interconnected to any external systems or networks (including 
the GIG), it can be assumed that the system could operate as it currently does today 
without any major security or operational impacts.  Given that all critical system 
components are operated and stored in secure areas within an installation, it could also be 
assumed that physical security would not be an issue.  Also, by not changing the current 
system, there would also be no impacts to the logistics or training requirements.   
Some of the concerns that exist concerning this COA are that this would be in 
violation of the directives given by the DA.  As a result, there could be cuts in funding 
and resources, placing the PM’s program in jeopardy of being cut.  The system would 
operate as it currently does, but not be as secure as leadership would like.  The system 
could become vulnerable as technology advances are made by adversaries to impede the 
performance and capability of the LMR system.  Another downside to the “take no 
action” option is that the LMR system would have to remain an isolated system and a 
method for providing information produced on external systems to the first responders 
would need to be developed.  Operationally, the users would suffer as sensitive 




networks needed to provide information.  If it ever came to that and it was decided that 
changes should be made after all, then any changes made to implement IA requirements 
would require extra time and significant efforts to modify the LMR system. 
2. COA 2—Implement the Full IA Requirements Throughout All 
Portions of the LMR  
This approach employs the tenets of defense-in-depth for layering IA solutions 
within and among IT assets.  The IA solutions have the appropriate robustness, as 
determined by the relative strength of the mechanism by which they are employed and 
the confidence that the solutions are implemented and perform as intended.  The IA 
solutions that provide availability, integrity and confidentiality also provide 
authentication and non-repudiation for the LMR system.  This approach presumes that 
the LMR system would be protected as if it were on, or connected to the GIG.    
This COA would provide the most robust security features and therefore the most 
operationally secure solution.  The security measures that would be instituted would 
provide an appearance of a much more secure system (than with COA approach 1 or 3) 
designed to keep out such concerns as computer bugs, viruses and worms, in addition to 
other adversarial “hack” into the LMR system.  The IA security measures would account 
for physical, operational and most importantly, cyber security.   
Although the LMR system would have an appearance of greater security, 
pursuing this approach would require a significant increase in funding and resources to 
incorporate the IA control measures required.  This approach would put a burden on the 
funding available for all LMR systems.  Additional funding would have to be requested, 
and if enough funding was not provided capabilities would be sacrificed to pay for the 
increased IA requirements.  Additional resources would be required to accommodate the 
full IA effort, to include the LMR architecture to protect it from interfaces to external 
systems and the GIG.  Additional man-hours would be required not just initially, but 
throughout lifetime of the system.  Vendors would be forced to change their commercial 
LMR system designs to comply with new IA requirements.  Furthermore, vendors would 




cases, create all new divisions in their organizations dedicated to implementing these new 
IA security requirements.  In the PM office, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) would be 
required to assist the PM with the ATO process and provide guidance on writing the new 
IA requirements.  Experts proficient in IA regulations would be required to draft and 
coordinate the necessary paperwork to get final ATO approvals to operate the LMR 
system.  These SMEs would be required by the PM to not only assist the government, but 
also the vendors as they proceed through the acquisition and DIACAP process.  All of 
these actions would require increased funding and would negatively impact the LMR 
production schedules such that required capabilities would delay fieldings. 
Implementing the aforementioned comprehensive C&A process and following the 
DIACAP fully would require identifying baseline configurations, authenticating all 
vendor hardware and software, as well as approving all systems before being allowed to 
operate.   These are just the LMR specific areas that would need to be evaluated during 
DIACAP.  The “presumed” interfaces and interoperability between the LMR and external 
systems and networks, such as the GIG, would also need to be fully analyzed and new 
designs for these interfaces developed.  Additional time would definitely be required 
should this option be chosen.  Many of the IA requirements identified by the government 
would only be able to be performed by the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) 
directly.  This would require additional time for third party products to “catch up” to IA 
requirements that have been levied on them by the LMR prime vendors.  Additional 
system scans, validations, checks, as well as time for coordination throughout the 
government would be required and additional time to the LMR schedules.     
This full-scale C&A process would test and validate all vendors’ hardware and 
software, as well as third party hardware and software that would be used in the vendors’ 
LMR systems.  Vendors would be required to modify their LMR system designs to 
comply with the approved list of products identified by the National Information 
Assurance Partnership (NIAP).57 In addition, other security measures for background 
checks for vendors and fences around areas containing LMR hardware would need to be 




After the initial approval process was completed and the ATO provided, ongoing 
LMR system scans and updates would have to be provided by the vendor to keep up with 
any new security threats.  Seeing as a new ATO is required every three years, these 
processes and efforts to update security in the LMR would be ongoing.  As time 
progresses, LMR system hardware technology would change and many of the hardware 
components that currently comprising the system would need to be replaced or updated 
only due to “security” threats, to keep up with IA policy revisions.  This would require 
the vendor to upgrade the system with new components that meet the new IA 
requirements and that these components work with the existing ones in the LMR system 
and are backwards compatible.   
In addition, personnel in the PM office would be required to be trained on this 
new process and how it affects their LMR customers.  The customers in the field would 
also be required to undergo training to learn the new IA capabilities of the new hardware 
and software.  As new equipment would be added to the system architecture, the logistics 
trail would be affected as well.     
3. COA 3—Implement an IA Plan for Platform IT with No Interconnect 
to the Network 
This approach pursues a solution in between those proposed in the previous two 
COAs.  LMR is a stand-alone, self-contained radio platform that can be categorized as 
non-GIG IT and can therefore be considered, based on its mission, a Platform IT system.  
As such, it would be subject to IA policies but not the full-blown DIACAP C&A process.  
This COA proposes that IA be integrated onto the Platform IT or “enclaved” LMR 
system, with no interconnection to external systems, such as the GIG.  
The Platform IT approach would require minimal IA implementation and support 
since the system would be separate and not at risk from attacks originating from external 
systems.  Seeing as the LMR is Platform IT, the need for accreditations to operate every 
three years or have constant maintenance to upgrade the IT equipment would be 
unnecessary. This would greatly reduce the funding burden that a full blown C&A effort 




accommodate the IA effort is minimal in comparison to COA 2 above.  This would allow 
for the IA Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to only be required during the production 
phase of the LMR system.  No funding or resources would be required to design and 
develop an interconnection to various external systems or networks, thus easing the 
funding burden on the PM.  The time required to designate a LMR system as Platform IT 
and implement an IA program to support it would be minimal in comparison to COA 2 
above.  The oversight and the number of organizations involved with interconnecting to 
the GIG would be eliminated, thus reducing time for coordination and other activities.  
The PM would retain the responsibility to incorporate IA and the controls that would be 
implemented.  The time necessary would be solely based on the system and the direction 
given by the PM.  The security and IA capabilities of the Platform IT could be increased 
by simply incorporating or enhancing the COMSEC and TRANSEC capabilities.  By not 
having an interconnection (to outside networks or to the GIG), the LMR system would 
still be able to operate securely, but without the increased network related IA controls 
that do not add to the IA controls of the “stand-alone” LMR.  By not significantly 
impacting the current system’s architecture, the system would be able to maintain its 
level of readiness and availability.  The amount of overhead on the system’s links 
resulting from the additional “network” IA policies being implemented on the LMR 
would be absent.  Congestion and blockages would not be as significant, as the system 
would not have an increased amount of users from the external systems.  Without the 
extra equipment needed to interface with the external networks, the training duration and 
difficulty would be lessened.  The operators would only be responsible for the Platform 
IT equipment, without the distraction from external system equipment.  Logistically, the 
trail would be shorter with fewer transport mechanisms needed to get equipment to the 
field, whether for initial fielding or replacements.  By reducing the amount of systems 
and equipment needed to focus on, the maintenance and personnel support could be 
reduced as well. 
Although there are positive aspects to this COA, there are several negative areas 
to consider also.  Even though, the costs would be less expensive than COA 2, which 




an increase to the current program’s funding line.  Additional resources would still be 
needed for this COA, as new equipment would be needed to provide the IA 
enhancements as well as a team of personnel to get involved to ensure the new IA 
requirements could be implemented without incurring a significant negative impact on 
the mission and operation of the system.  The time needed to implement these changes 
could have a negative impact on milestones and decision points already scheduled at that 
time.  The system would need to be fully tested to determine if any capabilities would be 
lost as a result of implementing the IA features, as well as determine if there would be 
any performance degradation.  Since there would be additional equipment and security 
features implemented, there would be an increase in the logistics tail as well as an 
increase in maintenance support.  The users of the system would also have to be trained 
on the new features and operation of the system.  The logistics considerations would be 





















































In the previous chapter, three possible courses of actions for dealing with IA on 
COTS products were identified and analyzed.  Through the analysis of these COAs, 
several factors were identified that could be used as decision aids in determining which 
COA would be most beneficial to the U.S. Army.  In reviewing the three COAs 
discussed, only one alternative provides minimal impact to the U.S. Army while 
increasing the security integrity of the system.  In determining the optimal COA, a 
decision matrix was developed to assess the value of each of the five factors. 
The criteria selected for the decision matrix were as follows: funding and 
resources, time, security, performance of the system following the changes and 
operational impacts.  Each of these factors was identified and discussed in the analysis 
section.  The order of importance, determined based on current mission requirements and 
policies, is:  1) IA Security.  The sole purpose of these changes is to make the system 
more secure from an IA point of view.  2)  Funding.  Affordability is a priority due to 
increasing funding shortfalls.  3) Performance.  The system has a mission to operate 
continuously and cannot be impacted by security measures.  4) Operational or logistical 
impacts.  The logistics and maintenance impacts should not be significant.  5) Time.  
Schedule impacts to the system as a result of implementing security can not jeopardize 
mission implementation. 
Table 2, which follows, shows the matrix used to assist in making the decision.  It 
identifies the criteria and the rating for each COA.  The criteria were ordered on the chart 
according to importance. The ratings assigned to each COA were determined based on 
how well that COA met the criteria.  These were rated on a scale of 1 to 3, with 1 being 







Table 2.   COA Decision Matrix (From: Chaney, Corzine, Paolercio, Authors, 2009) 
As shown, it was determined that COA 3 is the most favorable and should be 
pursued.   
COA 1, the “take no action” option, is always available to those willing to accept 
the consequences.  However, in the current posture of Information Technology and the 
ever-growing need to protect information as part of our “War on Terror,” this option is 
not really an acceptable alternative for a PM.  Although this option was scored the second 
best, it should not be considered.  This COA scored best in the funding, time and 
operational criteria only due to the fact that no changes would be made to the current 
system and therefore there would be no impacts in these areas.  It scored the worst in the 
most important factor, security, and as a result, shows that it could not meet the 
requirements to implement IA into the LMR system.  
COA 2, implementing the full C&A requirements, is a costly, time-consuming 
process that may be overkill.  The likelihood that a significant amount of LMR 
communications would be added to the GIG is relatively small.  Although incorporation 
of LMR onto the GIG could provide benefits in the future, the IA technology needed to 
allow the LMR system access is still immature at best.  Furthermore, LMR 
communications must have top-priority status on any architecture to be effective.  Their 
nature as a life-saving First Responder system puts LMR in grave danger when added to 
such a massive, high usage network, such as the GIG.  This is evident by having the 
worst score.  Although, the security would be the most robust, the other factors suffer 




COA 3, Implement an IA Plan for Platform IT Enclave, is the recommendation of 
this team.  The third COA, Platform IT, should be considered the only option.  In addition 
to the savings in time, funding and manpower resources, Platform IT would alleviate the 
need to re-certify the system every three years.  Historically, LMR systems have a 
lifespan of 10–15 years without the need to upgrade or replace major hardware.  With the 
insertion the C&A process, many of these systems would require major hardware and 
software upgrades to maintain security of the GIG, long before the LMR life cycle is 
expended.  This could ultimately cost the government billions of dollars in unnecessary 
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